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In his Preface to The Nigger of the 'Narcissus',
Joseph Conrad writes, "My task which I am try
ing
achieve is, by
power of the written
word, to make you feel,
make you hear — it
is, before all, to make you see" (143). This pow
erful declaration of Conrad's literary impres
sionism still serves as the clearest embodiment
of his artistic credo, a declaration which remains
of late Victorian
early modernist litera
ture's most important artistic statements.1
Although he is not, of course, announcing his
own version of literary impressionism, Louis
Althusser probably has Conrad's words in mind
when he explains that "the peculiarity of art is
to 'make us see' (nous donner à voir), 'make us
perceive', 'make us feel' something which
alludes to reality" (204). For Althusser, "what art
makes us see,
therefore gives to us in the
form of 'seeing', 'perceiving',
'feeling' (which
is not the form of knowing), is the ideology from
which it is born, in which it bathes, from which
it detaches itself as art, and to which it alludes"
(204). For Conrad it is the impression itself that
is "everything," although he adds that some
how one may
find "that glimpse of truth for
which you have forgotten to ask" (Preface 143).
It is intriguing
conceive of Althusser's "per
ceiving" of "ideology" as a cleverly reinterpret
ed Conradian "glimpse of truth," though the
projects of these two men seem worlds apart.
Interestingly, whether by pure coincidence or by
inexorable connection, Conrad's Heart of
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Darkness in fact serves as an extremely productive text from which to
explore the strengths
weaknesses of the contemporary Marxist cri
tique of ideology.
Although traditional Marxism certainly has had its own disagree
ments,2 since the work of Althusser contemporary Marxism has found
itself increasingly confronted by two seemingly divergent trends: tradi
tional (scientific, classical) Marxism with its emphasis on dialectical
materialism and on ideology as false consciousness, and critical (postAlthusserian) Marxism with its post-structuralist aversion "totalizing
closures"
Althusser's reconception of ideology as "a rep
resentation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real
conditions of existence."
In
Political Unconscious, Fredric Jameson attempts a critical
articulation of these two tendencies.
Jameson's project is to
"restructure the problematics of ideology . .. around the all-informing
process of narrative" (13).3 He employs ideology "in Althusser's sense
as a representational structure which allows the individual subject to
conceive his or her lived relationship to transpersonal realities such as
the social structure or the collective logic of History" (30). He likewise
accepts "the Althusserian dictum, 'History is a process without a telos
or a subject'... as a repudiation of... master narratives
their twin
categories of narrative closure (telos) and of character (subject of histo
ry)" (29).
At the same time, Jameson himself admits that his fundamental
premise, that Marxism is the "untranscendable horizon" that "sub
sumes" all other interpretations, hearkens back
the "more authentic
dialectical tradition" of classical Marxism (10). Jameson grounds this
premise upon the assumption that "history is not a text, not a narrative,
master or otherwise" (35). Significantly, however, Jameson qualifies this
assertion in an attempt effect a reconciliation with post-Althusserian
Marxism: History is thus posited as "an absent cause ... inaccessible to
us except in textual form" (35). This "genuine philosophy of history"
(18) leads Jameson
postulate "the unity of a single great collective
story," which is "the collective struggle
wrest a realm of Freedom
from a realm of Necessity" (19).
In order apply his ideas to literature, Jameson proposes analyzing
texts from three "concentric frameworks" (75). Jameson's final frame
work, that of "the ideology of form" (76), corresponds with modernism,
for this analysis he chooses as his texts Conrad's Lord Jim
Nos
omo. In this essay I will explore how a parallel sort of Jamesonian
reading of Heart of Darkness offers
insightful and productive glimpse
into the ideology of the Conradian
Yet I
will explore how such
a reading reveals The Political Unconscious, itself
be merely another
ideological text, one with its own master narrative
attendant imag
inary narrative closure.
The Jamesonian approach
Conrad "posits ideology in terms of
strategies of containment, whether intellectual or (in the
of narra-
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tives) formal" (52-53). This premise implies that the formal aspects of a
text are in fact "sedimented content in their own right, as carrying ide
ological messages of their own" (Jameson 99) — hence the term the ide
ology ofform." Jameson begins his discussion by analyzing the strategies
of containment created by the combination of the high and mass culture
modes in the novels, concluding from these strategies that while “Lord
Jim remains stubbornly deflected onto the problematic of the individual
act," Nostromo becomes a "meditation on History" (264). It is in order to
explore the fullest ramifications of both of these positions in relation to
the ideology ofform that Jameson turns to A. J. Greimas's use of the semi
otic rectangle. This semiotic rectangle at first seems irreconcilable with
a Marxist critique because it is "organized around binary oppositions
rather than dialectical ones"
because it structures the relationships
it creates "in terms of homology" (47). Yet for Jameson this choice is an
appropriate one for a project structured "around the all-informing
process of narrative" in that Greimas's work (as Jameson characterizes it
in Marxism and Form) involves "analyzing
kinds of verbal materials .
. . in terms of a storytelling model" (Marxism 205).
Jameson, then, "reappropriates" Greimas's system "by designating it
as the very locus and model of ideological closure" (47).4 That is, the
semiotic rectangle "furnishes the graphic embodiment of ideological
closure as such,
allows us to map out the inner limits of a given ide
ological formation and
construct the basic terms of this particular
libidinal apparatus ..." (48). Such a construction, for Jameson, pro
vides a glimpse of "the informing power of forces or contradiction
which the text seeks in vain wholly to control or master," a glimpse
"into the very political unconscious" (49).
If we begin apply Jameson's approach Heart of Darkness, we are
immediately confronted by the question of whether the text should be
read as centering upon "the problematic of the individual act" (as Jame
son reads Lord Jim) or upon "a meditation on History" (as he reads Nos
tromo). Clearly it is possible to see it either way. The former would
claim either Kurtz's or Marlow's glimpse "over the edge" as the focal
point of the text (or, one may even claim both characters, each in his
own individual way, serve as separate focal points). The latter would
argue that it is the collective action revolving around the Belgian expe
dition that is significant as separate individual acts merge into the ideal
synthesis of a collective actant. Although the former approach also
yields interesting insights, I will be using the latter here because it bet
ter exposes the ideology ofform in Heart of Darkness
reveals the desire
for ideological closure within the Jamesonian critique itself.
Jameson's Greimassian schematic for Nostromo actually works quite
nicely for Heart of Darkness as well,
it offers a persuasive reading of
the text's mechanism for narrative closure. The semiotic rectangle is
formed by mapping two interrelated sets of contradictory pairs, which
Jameson explains in a footnote his chapter on Realism
Desire. It
is worth quoting
sentence comprising this explanation in full:
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Briefly, the semiotic rectangle or "elementary structure of signi
fication" is the representation of a binary opposition or of two
contraries (S
-S), along with the simple negations or contra
dictions of both terms
so-called subcontraries -S
S): sig
nificant slots are constituted by the various possible combina
tions of these terms, most notably the "complex" term (or ideal
synthesis of the two contraries) and the "neutral" term (or ideal
synthesis of the two subcontraries).
(166)

Graphically deployed, the primary pair of contraries form the upper
corners of
rectangle (with S in the upper left and -S in the upper
right)
their simple negations form the bottom corners (facing them
diagonally, with -S in the lower left
S in
lower right).
Jameson's explanation of this semiotic rectangle in his chapter on
Louis Marin in Volume 2 of The Ideologies of Theory is helpful in under
standing how the rectangle works, as well as suggestive of its relation
ship to Jameson's utopianism. Here Jameson explains that, while
Claude Lévi-Strauss understands mediation in his work on myth
"essentially as an operation bearing on the two 'primary' terms of the
fundamental contradiction or binary opposition itself" (S and -S),
Greimas argues that "this by no means exhausts the logical possibilities
and permutational combinations inherent in the simplest binary oppo
sition" ("Of Islands" 78). In fact, "not only do
logical contradictoris
[sic] of S and -S furnish two more independent terms, but the various
axes thus generated (negative
positive deixis, implication, contra
dictions) suggest that [Greimas's rectangle] is capable of generating a
number of quite distinct 'mediatory' combinations alongside the one
operative in Lévi-Strauss'[s] mythic resolutions, designated in
Greimas'[s] system as the complex term C" ("Of Islands" 78).
In detailing how Greimas's rectangle clarifies for us the difference
between myth in Lévi-Strauss
the Utopian in Marin, Jameson fur
ther supplements our understanding of the workings of this logical
schema. According to Jameson, the Utopian narrative is for Marin "the
structural inversion of myth":

[whereas] the narrative operation of myth undertakes mediate
between the two primary terms of the opposition S and -S, and
produce a complex term that would be their resolution, Utopi
an narrative is constituted by the union of the twin contradicto
ries of the initial opposition, the combination of -S
S, a com
bination which, virtually a double cancellation of the initial con
tradiction itself, may be said to effect the latter's neutralization
to produce a new term, the so-called neuter or neutral term
N.
("Of Islands" 79)
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Returning to Jameson's use of this schema in reading Nostromo, then,
Jameson posits
text's primary pair of contraries as that of
Ideal
versus the Self, which in turn generates the simple negations of Cyni
cism
Selflessness. Graphically displayed, Ideal
Self are the
upper left and upper right corners respectively, and Selflessness and
Cynicism
the lower left
lower right corners respectively. In plot
ting Nostromo and
characters, Jameson
the Ideal as represented
by Decoud (also parenthetically associated with Charles Gould
cap
italism) and the Self as represented by Nostromo (also parenthetically
associated with Viola and nationalism/populism). The complex term
represented by the union of these two characters is literalized in the text
by the Decoud-Nostromo expedition, The Act. Their simple negations,
combining to form the neutral term of The Witness, are represented by
the Women (Selflessness)
Dr. Monygham (Cynicism). The vertical
sides offer their own semic combinations as well: the left
of Ideal
Selflessness invokes (through Decoud and Antonia) Marriage, the
Victorian hearth,
(parenthetically) extinction; the right side of Self
Cynicism invokes (through Nostromo and Dr. Monygham) History,
Latin America,
(parenthetically) castration.
We may use the very same terms of the Nostromo rectangle in con
structing a rectangle for Heart of Darkness (that is,
rectangle would be
similarly constructed around the binary oppositions of self/selflessness
and idealism/cynicism,
would
incorporate the notion of a col
lective actant into the scheme in the form of The Act
The Witness).
Accordingly, in Heart of Darkness I associate Kurtz with the Ideal and the
Pilgrims — his partners in The Act (the Belgian "mission" in the Congo)
— with the Self. The Witness
the Act, testifying to
accomplish
ments) in front of the jury of readers in the courtroom of the text, is
formed by the collaboration of Kurtz's Intended (as Selflessness) and
Marlow (as Cynicism). Finally, then, the left side's semic combination of
Kurtz and his Intended invokes Marriage,
Sepulchral City, and
extinction; while the right side's semic combination of the Pilgrims and
Marlow invokes History, the Congo,
castration.
Marlow (as Cynicism) reveals the Pilgrims to be motivated solely by
"desire
get appointed
a trading-post where ivory
to be had"
(Conrad, Heart 27),5 even at the expense of their fellow Pilgrims. This
"self"-centeredness of the Pilgrims appears empty to Marlow, a notion
he verbalizes when he describes the brickmaster as a "papier-mâché
Mephistopheles" through whom
could poke his finger
"find
nothing inside but a little loose
maybe" (29). All of the Pilgrims are
so because they lack the one thing that in Marlow's opinion "redeems"
the project of "taking [the earth] away from those who have a different
complexion or slightly flatter noses": "an idea at
back of it; not a sen
timental pretense but
idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea" (10;
emphasis added).
Kurtz, on
other hand, is the embodiment of the great ideals
behind the colonization, and even in his "fallen state" he transcends the
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self-centeredness of the Pilgrims. According to the Russian youth,
Kurtz's state among the natives is one of self-annihilation, not self-idolization: "[he would] forget himself amongst these people — forget him
self" (56). The result, as Marlow observes, is that "there was nothing
either above or below him.... He had kicked himself loose of the earth"
(65). Yet Kurtz too is empty on the inside, "hollow at the core" (58). The
ideological ramifications of this are enormous. Kurtz
the Pilgrims
were to produce
"ideal synthesis" in The Act, yet nothingness com
bined with nothingness begets only nothingness.
Thus in Jameson's neutral term (Selflessness/Cynicism as The Wit
ness), the text's ideological strategy of containment is revealed: to
resolve The Act's apparent failure
achieve any sort of "ideal synthe
sis,"
Witness must create exactly such a synthesis out of the noth
ingness in order to allow for narrative closure. Marlow by himself is
more than cynical as far as the expedition (The Act) is concerned. Even
before his journey he feels
Company is not in Africa because of highsounding ideals, which
supposedly will represent as well, but mere
ly for profit (16). Yet this same Marlow who has witnessed
hollow
ness of both the Pilgrims
Kurtz, who
at Kurtz's death "the
expression of sombre pride, of ruthless power, of craven terror — of an
intense and hopeless despair" (68),
who hears those final words
that expose what Patrick Brantlinger argues is no more than a "lying
idealism which can rationalize any behavior" (381) — this
Mar
low, when confronted by
Selflessness of the Intended, affirms this
very "lying idealism" with a lie!
The Intended believes in Kurtz and his ideals,
in their ability to
transform the expedition.
believes in him with a selflessness (thus
she is given no name) exemplified even in her reaction
his death:
"'What a loss me — to us,' she corrected herself .... 'To the world'"
(74).6 Marlow's lie then becomes necessary for closure; it is what holds
off chaos
heaven's fall)
instead in effect affirms the ideal vision
of the Intended. In this
the text can close itself off from the noth
ingness, for the alternative "would have been too dark - too dark alto
gether" (76). Thus the interaction of the two members of The Witness
end allows for the hollow nature of The Act
present itself as the
ideal synthesis it in truth fails
achieve.
The Jamesonian reading
this ideological closure as finalized by
the resolution of the last two "semic combinations," which correspond
to the two geographical centers of the
may appropriate Jame
very own words
Nostromo here: The combination of Self and
Cynicism is represented by the Congo (in the form of the "nightmare of
history") in that both Marlow's view of the wilderness as silent, brood
ing and impenetrable, and the Pilgrims' view of Africa as only a social
economic opportunity, create
"indeterminate background" of
"the classic 'Anglo' picture" of a Third World setting that is important
only as a pretext for the "real" (read, "Anglo") story (Jameson 270).
Such a view of
Congo only serves reinforce the privileging of the

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol7/iss1/4

6

Foss: Jameson, Conrad, and the Dialectic of Utopia and Ideology

Chris Foss

47

world of Idealism and Selflessness as represented by the ideal vision of
Sepulchral City in
form of the unsundered spiritual union of
Kurtz
the Intended that remains intact through
lie.
As the Jamesonian (re)appropriation of Greimas intended, the semi
otic rectangle has produced a "graphic embodiment of ideological clo
sure" that offers a glimpse of the "informing power" of the hollowness
of Heart of Darkness which the text's ideology ofform attempts to repress.
Jameson's observation concerning the Nostromo rectangle would seem to
be even more applicable to Heart of Darkness: "Yet such a scheme
explains everything but the essential, namely the dynamics of the ideal
act itself, of the impossible synthesis or complex term" (277). In other
words, the ideological scheme is itself hollow. Thus, Jameson writes of
the ideal act in Nostromo, "So the act happens . . . even though it is
impossible"
even though "it turns out that the act, the event, never
happened" (278). So in Heart of Darkness: the ideal act happens (as con
firmed illusion in Marlow's lie) even though it never happened (in actu
ality,
Kurtz
the Pilgrims confirm is hollowness). On this level the
text's attempt at narrative closure must remain unsuccessful: the Sepul
chral City can
longer justify its idealism or
Anglo vision of the
Congo. In this light, the fact that the heavens do not fall at Marlow's lie
is perhaps more ominous than if they
Jameson notes that in Nostromo the "semic space" of Marriage,
though supposedly "the place of love ...
sexual experience, is dom
inated by the quite different affective experience of the fainting spell, or
of extinction" (277). Similarly, one
may see the
space in Heart
of Darkness as dominated by extinction. The marriage of Kurtz and the
Intended, like the ideal act itself, never happens. There can be
con
summation. Indeed, it is a marriage of emptiness, for the Intended is
hollow too in that in her selflessness she does not exist.
only exists
in Kurtz, who himself is hollow. Thus the two emissaries of the Sepul
chral City (Idealism
Selflessness) are as hollow as,
no better
than, the Selfishness and Cynicism that make up the Anglo vision of
Africa. The Sepulchral City is truly a "city of the dead" (14), as empty
as the Anglo Congo's impenetrable heart of darkness. Significantly,
grass sprouts both in between the
stones
Fresleven's ribs: they
are the same. In the final analysis Conrad's ideology of form leaves one
with nothing more than a hollow story, something one might have
expected from Marlow to begin with, since for him "the meaning of an
episode
not inside like a kernel but outside" (9) — because there is
no inside.
Jameson's use of Greimas's schema offers yet another fruitful per
spective on Conradian hollowness,
in this the ideology ofform ends
up providing fresh insight into both Conrad narratives. One may apply
Jameson's conclusion on Nostromo Heart of Darkness as well:
This ... novel finally achieves its end by unravelling its means of
expression, "rendering" History by
thoroughgoing demon-
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stration of the impossibility of narrating this unthinkable dimen
sion of collective reality, systematically undermining the indi
vidual categories of storytelling in order
project, beyond the
stories it must continue
tell, the concept of a process beyond
storytelling.
(279)

For Jameson,
what any "meditation
history" discovers is the
ultimate inaccessibility of History. History, as absent cause, is never
fully present,
as a result one is left with absence. Jameson thus
posits that "history itself becomes the ultimate ground as well as the
untranscendable limit of our understanding in general
our textual
interpretations in particular" (100). Consequently, "history is inaccessi
ble to us except in textual form.... it can be approached only by
of
prior (re)textualization" (82).
Significantly, however, the absence we are left with is not non-exis
tence, not the nothingness of Heart of Darkness, but rather the inaccessi
bility of history as absent cause. Although absent, History exists for
Jameson as cause. Thus, despite the admittedly textual nature of reali
ty, Jameson claims History itself is not a text because "it is fundamen
tally non-narrative
nonrepresentational" (82). Such an assumption
holds up History as an "extra- or con-textual reality," which Jameson
justifies through the concept of Necessity: he writes, "one does not have
argue
reality of history:
like Dr. Johnson's stone,
that for us" (82). It is in examining this view of History as "the experi
ence of Necessity" (102) —
the apparent begging of the question
which would seem to accompany it — that
avenue opens through
which one can expose the ideology behind Jameson's own critique of
ideology.
So far I have demonstrated how impressively Jameson's reading of
Nostromo applies to Heart of Darkness; my initial point here is that
Jameson's
Political Unconscious has much to offer to Conrad stud
ies in particular, and late Victorian/early modernist studies in general.
Moving on to my second point now, I want to argue that Jameson him
self resorts
the very sort of ideological cover-up he dissects in Con
rad.
We may begin unraveling Jameson's own reading by re-examining
his original semiotic rectangle for Nostromo. He writes that "Nostromo is,
like Lord Jim, the interrogation of a hole in time, an act whose innermost
instant falls
— proving thus at once irrevocable
impossible, a
source of scandal
aporia for contemplation" (264). Although
Jameson's reading of Nostromo is truly insightful
useful, his
unshakeable belief that "history itself becomes the ultimate ground as
well as
untranscendable limit of our understanding in general and
our textual interpretations in particular" (100) leads him
posit his
utopian vision as the logical, if not inexorable, result of this contempla
tion. I would argue that, in actuality, what Jameson's reading finally
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reveals is its own political unconscious as an ideology that attempts to
bear Witness to the efficacy of The Act performed by his own Utopian
hermeneutic in conjunction with his Conradian texts as textual repre
sentatives of modernism.
fact that Jameson
Conrad's stylistic practice "as ideology
Utopia all at once" (237) is extremely significant. Indeed, this
appears to be the underlying assumption upon which his whole reading
of Nostromo builds in that he posits Nostromo as "a virtual textbook
working out of
structuralist dictum that all narrative enacts a pas
from Nature Culture" (272), a passage that one may say has been
achieved at the book's conclusion by the successful establishment of the
capitalistic Republic of Sulaco.
Since for Jameson modernism "is itself
ideological expression of
capitalism" (236),
the one hand the ideology ofform in Nostromo is no
more than a reiteration of the capitalist ideology of commodity
fetishism. Jameson rightfully
the book, for instance, as perpetuat
ing traditional European stereotyping of Latin Americans in an objecti
fying process that at bottom casts them as Other. Yet Jameson's afore
mentioned conception of Conrad's stylistic practice allows him to see
text as containing utopian as well as ideological elements. Jameson
his reading as establishing the possibility that "we can restore, at
least methodologically,
lost unity of social life, and demonstrate that
widely distant elements of the social totality are ultimately part of the
same global historical process" (226). Here, although the particular
manifestation may not be appealing, Sulaco capitalism nevertheless rep
resents a transformation of the focus upon the individual to a "new per
spective" of "collective destiny" (269). This is because, for Jameson,
even "ruling-class culture
ideology are Utopian, not in spite of their
instrumental function to secure
perpetuate class privilege and
power, but rather precisely because that function is also in
of itself
the affirmation of collective solidarity" (291). Again, any affirmation of
collective solidarity only ultimately confirms History as "the experience
of Necessity" (102).
Jameson himself points out
major flaw in
Greimassian
schematic, that it "explains everything but the essential, namely the
dynamics of the ideal act [The Act] itself" (277). For Jameson, the fact
that "the historical Event which marks a decisive shift from
state of
things (fallen nature)
another (genuine society)" (278) presents itself
as
aporia only serves as further proof that History is non-narratable,"inaccessible
us except in textual form" (82).Yet it may be that
there can be
explanation of the aporia simply because Jameson's own
ideological schema(tic) ultimately does not work; it is itself hollow.
Jameson seems
me
of the great critical minds of his genera
tion, so much so that I have a difficult time believing that he may be
unaware of the following ramifications of his argument. I only can
assume (in spite of the proverbial dangers contained within that
that Jameson feels his
justifies his means, that it is more important
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to narrate a compelling story of the priority of his version of Marxist
utopianism than it is craft an air-tight argument (when, after all, what
argument is air-tight?),
therefore that he engages in what I will call
deliberate miswriting.
What I mean by deliberate miswriting actually involves two interre
lated misleading attempts at a cover-up (or, perhaps, merely a make
the presentation
andargument.
give
) in Jameson's
some
to
he (102).
First, Jameson
on
to
andand

theof his own
mixes in some post-structuralist vocabulary to
the
heappearance that
this is a text of post-Althusserian critical Marxism when in fact this is a
text by a dyed-in-the-wool traditional Marxist whose devotion
the
cause actually ends up undermining the very sort of dialectical criticism
espouses. Second, Jameson engages in his own ideological strategies
of containment in order ensure that his own narrative of utopian ide
alism may achieve its end.
Critiquing Jameson's critique is difficult because
adroitly masks
his own ideology under the guise of a post-structuralist rendering of the
concept of Necessity: it is "a retextualization of History which does not
propose [History] as
new representation or 'vision,' some new
context, but as the formal effects of . . . 'absent cause'"
Because
"History can only be apprehended through its effects," according to
Jameson it avoids reification (102). This is why he (once again begging
the question) claims that history as untranscendable horizon "needs no
particular theoretical justification" — because "its alienating necessities
will not forget us" (102). Yet this is where he exposes the universalizing
tendencies of his approach. As noted earlier, no matter how skeptically
he may render his concept of History as absent cause, it is finally simply
another form of idealism because, whether or not History is absent or
inaccessible, it still is, it still exists as cause (and as a cause which mani
fests itself "through its effects," however retextualized those effects may
be).
Jameson, for whom "History is . . . the experience of Necessity"
(102), is in fact a conservative Marxist as will be readily apparent
throughout the rest of this essay. He consistently comes down
the
side of those heroes of traditional Marxism, Hegel and Lukács, and
adopts phenomenological, structuralist,
theological frameworks
from Ernst Bloch, Emile Durkheim, Paul Ricoeur,
Jean-Paul Sartre
in ways that potentially compromise the very "dialectical" nature of his
critique. For instance, when Jameson relates the crucial dynamics of
The Act in Nostromo, it is with self-professed recourse to "classical
Sartrean language" (278) and then to "more Hegelian terminology"
(279) — all in
service of a structuralist schematic that one will recall
be himself admits is "perhaps indeed misappropriated, by a dialectical
criticism" (48).
Much of Jameson's theorizing in The Political Unconscious finds its
ground in his earlier work Marxism and Form,
in fact he develops
these ideas in stages across the essays collected in The Ideologies of Theo
ry, most of which date from
years between the two major works.
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Throughout the rest of this essay, I will draw upon both of these texts to
supplement my argument about The Political Unconscious.
Accordingly, turning now Marxism and Form, we see Jameson con
sistently revealing his Hegelian stripes throughout this text, but perhaps
nowhere more blatantly than where he insists that the "impossibility
the Hegelian system for us is not a proof of
intellectual limitations,
its cumbersome methods
theological superstructure; on
con
trary, it is a judgment on us
on the moment in history in which we
live, and in which such a vision of the totality of things is
longer pos
sible" (Marxism
Marxism and Form also, of course, contains a whole
chapter in support of Lukács (perhaps the singlemost representative fig
ure of twentieth-century traditional Marxism) while the chapter on
Adorno (who for most stands opposite Lukács aligned with critical
Marxism) concludes with the passive-aggressive suggestion, "It is there
fore not to the discredit of Negative Dialektik to say that it is in the long
run a massive failure" (Marxism
Tellingly, Jameson
devotes
chapters to Sartrean phenomenology
a Marxist hermeneutic that
incorporates versions of nostalgia
Benjamin), romantic utopi
anism (Herbert Marcuse, in articulation with Friedrich Schiller), and
theological utopianism (Bloch).
conservatism of Jameson's Marxism
lies in his strict alignment with the Old Guard, and his critical facade is
at bottom largely an attempt
up that Old Guard in more con
temporary clothing ("meet the new boss — same as
old boss").
What is more, Jameson's universalizing tendencies and his teleological
narrative actually go further than this by cutting against the grain
genuine dialectical criticism as he himself defines it.
According
Jameson, true dialectical thought is "essentially
process: it never attains some ultimate place of systematic truth
which it can henceforth rest" (Marxism 372). Because of this "antisystematic thrust" (Marxism 362) to dialectical thought, one should see
Marxism as "a critical rather than a systematic philosophy" (Marxism
365). Consequently, "a genuinely dialectical criticism" must never
employ any "pre-established categories of analysis" (Marxism 333) and
must instead go so far as to "always include a commentary on its own
intellectual instruments as part of its own working structure" (Marxism
336) — for "dialectical thought is in its very structure self-conscious
ness" (Marxism 340).
Yet Jameson's argument in The Political Unconscious seems to present
both the dynamics of the narrative mode and the dialectic of utopia and
ideology as exactly such "pre-established categories of analysis," and
together they seem lead
an "ultimate place of systematic truth" —
namely, the utopian "realm of Freedom" which Marxism is
wrest
"from a realm of Necessity" (19). This utopia is the telos of the "single
great collective story" that only Marxism can retell as a "unity" and
thereby tap the "original urgency" of many pressing matters by its insis
tence upon representing "the human adventure as one" (19).
"absolute formalism" (Marxism 373)
the "structural histori
cism" that in "squaring
circle" is the "Marxist 'solution' to the dilem-
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ma of historicism" (Marxism 172) seem at odds with the "dialectical and
historical self-consciousness" also associated with Marxism's
"squar[ing] the circle" (Marxism
In The Ideologies of Theory Jameson
finds fault with the sort of "structural typology" he associates with Hay
den White in that it is ultimately grounded in "a narrative or teleologi
vision of history" ("Marxism" 169). Yet his own structural histori
cism seems similarly flawed. He claims that (his) Marxism is not a
"place of truth" or of "dogma/' clarifying that "only the Utopian future
is a place of truth" ("Marxism" 176) — but it bears observing that it is
this actual "place of truth" that awaits Jameson's "single great collective
story" which in The Political Unconscious is Marxism's "compelling reso
lution the dilemma of historicism" (19).
Here we seem to have both teleology and dogma. Should not a
properly "dialectical" Jameson be more self-conscious of the rhetorical
implications of his insistence upon the "priority of Marxist analysis as
that of some ultimate
untranscendable semantic horizon," the (in
his own words) "master code" ("Marxism" 48) of the same History as
absent cause that grounds his argument in The Political Unconscious?
Especially when he
refers to this conception of History as absent
cause as the "transcendental signified" ("Marxism" 49) of his Marxist
hermeneutic? He seems curiously unaware or unconcerned with his
terminology elsewhere — for example, in his appropriation of Ricoeur's
distinction between negative and positive hermeneutics in Marxism and
Form (which obviously then resurfaces in the conclusion to The Political
Unconscious), where he appears to privilege a positive hermeneutics
that offers "a restoration of some original, forgotten meaning" and
"renewed access
some essential source of life" (Marxism 119; emphasis
added). While Jameson does go on to imply that Ricoeur's failure to
imagine this "essential source of life" as "anything other than the
sacred" limits his view of the positive hermeneutic to "an essentially
religious one" (Marxism 119), Jameson seems thoroughly untroubled by
his own utopianism's religious overtones, if not its actual theological
nature.
Indeed, in Marxism and Form Jameson suggests there is a "basic affin
ity between Marxism
religion," which at least in part is founded
upon their shared "claim
universality" (Marxism 117). He even
admits that this fact raises "the suspicion that Bloch is not so much a
Marxist philosopher, even a Marxist philosopher of religion, as he is (in
the terms of his description of Thomas Münzer) a 'theologian of the rev
olution'" (Marxism 117). I suggest here that Jameson has himself taken
up this mantle of "theologian of the revolution" from Bloch, who
remains the most profound influence upon his own utopianism.
Tellingly, in his discussion of Bloch he recasts Ricoeur's distinction
between negative and positive hermeneutics as a distinction between
"the realm of philosophical judgment"
the realm of "hermeneutic
interpretation" (Marxism 132). As he does so he characterizes the former
as "operating" from a "critical" standpoint
latter as operating
"from a prophetic standpoint" (Marxism 132).
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Here we have Jameson as not only Theologian of the Revolution but
even more suggestively as Prophet of the Revolution. He clearly privi
leges the positive prophetic standpoint of the realm of hermeneutic
interpretation over the merely negative functioning of the critical stand
point of the realm of philosophical judgment. He writes, "When we
pass over into
[realm of hermeneutic interpretation], matters of truth
falsehood
way to techniques of conversion, modes of recov
ering that which is authentic
instinct even within the most regres
sive forms, to a decipherment of the figures of hope beneath the imme
diate surface realities of despair or destiny" (Marxism 132).
This is, ultimately, the project of The Political Unconscious. I want to
be very clear that I do not wish to be read here as some sort of critical
killjoy. I am not suggesting that the "decipherment of figures of hope
beneath the immediate surface realities of despair or destiny" is point
less, or that all utopian reading in particular
all positive hermeneu
tics in general are quixotic. My point is that, in the intellectual arro
gance of
self-assuredness where its own necessity
priority is con
cerned, Jameson's version gives such readings a bad name. The sub
sumption of all other interpretations under Jameson's Marxist
hermeneutic must appear misguided (if not elitist) to non-Marxists, and
even
many post-Althusserian Marxists as well. Even more so, Jame
conceptions of History
Necessity reveal his dialectical vision
as that of a retro-traditional Marxism. When he not only posits an
"inexorable logic involved in the determinate failure" of
"local" rev
olutions (102), but
even in such failures a "simultaneously
Utopian power as the symbolic affirmation of a specific historical and
class form of collective unity" (291), we are left with what might be
called a Utopian determinism.
Jameson's semiotic rectangle does achieve his goal of exposing the
ideological closure in Conrad as
but in spite of
this he imme
diately resubmerges the threat of such hollowness under the waters of
History in
ultimately utopian gesture that reveals
equally hollow
ideological closure in The Political Unconscious itself. That this is indeed
in Jameson's critique, if only suspected at first, becomes mani
festly clear in the concluding chapter of The Political Unconscious. Here
Jameson states that "all class consciousness ...
ideology ... is in its
very nature Utopian" (289). He can be content with absence as long as
it is not
threat of hollowness, of the meaninglessness of non-narrative history. But his analysis of the ideology ofform has uncovered a noth
ingness perhaps too reminiscent of nihilism for his liking. Such a neg
ative hermeneutic, one that merely uncovers hollowness, is for Jameson
insufficient: "a Marxist negative hermeneutic, a Marxist practice of ide
ological analysis proper, must in the practical work of reading and
interpretation be exercised simultaneously with a Marxist positive
hermeneutic, or a decipherment of the Utopian impulses of these same
still ideological cultural texts" (296). How then does a Jamesonian
approach decipher Utopian impulses in Heart of Darkness when, as
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Philip Wood argues, it would seem only
uncover "the futility, the
delusions, and criminal compromises fatally attendant upon
action
once its inescapably social imbrication within
alienating world is rec
ognized" (44)? When such a "hollow" novel only seems to thereby "jus
tify any injustice" (Brantlinger 380)?
Jameson's solution is to argue that an ideology, no matter what it
may entail, "expresses
unity of a collectivity" (291). Thus, even "rul
ing-class culture
ideology are Utopian, not in spite of their instru
mental function secure
perpetuate class privilege
power, but
rather precisely because that function is also in
of itself
affirma
tion of collective solidarity" (291). In other words, the very existence of
ideology of class consciousness, although not utopian in itself, is
Utopian because it functions as a figure "for the ultimate concrete col
lective life of
achieved Utopian or classless society" (291). This is,
again, a direct result of Jameson's view of History as ultimate ground,
for although
absent cause, its reality is experienced in Necessity (and
here experienced as the necessity of class conflict that the presence of
ideology guarantees). For Jameson, then, any narrative, no matter how
completely it seeks represent or perpetuate the ideology of the ruling
ultimately functions as evidence and as justification of the utopi
impulse owing the dialectic of utopia and ideology. Finally,
is
left with what amounts to some sort of Utopian determinism, the Neces
sity of the future Utopian place of truth.
Clearly such a reading would not seem particularly attractive to crit
ics concerned with the imperialism, racism, and sexism in Heart of Dark
ness. Jameson's Utopian master stroke would seem, on one level, to
"justify any injustice" even more so than the hollowness he has attempt
ed
offset in his conclusion. As in Marlow's endorsement of what he
sees as a good kind of imperialism, an "idea at the back of it" redeems
Jameson's project. In his conclusion Jameson himself belies precisely
such an orientation when he complains that the Althusserian
post
structuralist critiques are insufficient in that they "have a purely nega
tive or second-degree critical function, and offer no new conceptual cat
egories," when "what is wanted here ... is a whole new logic of collec
tive dynamics, with categories that escape the taint of some mere appli
cation of terms drawn from individual experience" (294; emphasis
added). Because Jameson wants such a new logic, he turns to
Durkheim's theory of religion to restore some sort of positive hermeneu
tic more in line with his own Utopian impulse to locate Utopian impuls
es in all texts. Although he claims "serious reservations" must be
expressed about this move from both Marxist
post-structuralist
positions because it amounts to "a generalization of Durkheim's theory
of religion to cultural production as a whole"
he proceeds to put
these reservations rest until he has justified the necessity of a positive
hermeneutic as
In a note on the observation, by Barry Hindess
Paul Hirst, that
a Durkheimian problematic
Marxism are incompatible, Jameson
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remarks, "One is tempted to add: in that case, too bad for Marxism"
(296). As Geoff Bennington cleverly points out, what Jameson is actual
ly saying in the remark is, too bad for Fredric Jameson's Marxism (31)!
In any case, Jameson justifies his recourse Durkheim's religious theo
ry by noting that, until the task of theorizing this "whole new logic of
collective dynamics" is completed, "it seems possible continue to use
a Durkheimian or Lukácsean vocabulary of collective consciousness or
of the subject of history 'under erasure/" as long as it is understood that
this vocabulary refers "to
as yet untheorized object — the collective
— which they make imperfect allusion" (294). As Jameson articulates
the value of religion for Marxism in Marxism and Form, one begins to
comprehend the function of his religious utopianism as individual
wish-fulfillment: "The value of religion for revolutionary activity lies
therefore in its structure as a hypostasis of absolute conviction, as a pas
sionate inner subjective coming consciousness of those deepest Utopi
an wishes without which Marxism remains an objective theory and is
deprived of its most vital resonances and of
most essential psychic
sustenance" (Marxism 157).
Jameson himself claims that "every universalizing approach ... will
. . . conceal
own contradictions
repress its own historicity by
strategically framing its perspective so as
omit the negative, absence,
contradiction, repression, the non-dit, or the impensé"
At this
point I would like
suggest that the Greimassian semiotic rectangle
actually might be employed
tilt into view the impensé
political
unconscious) of The Political Unconscious, to furnish us with "the graph
ic embodiment" of the "ideological closure" in Jameson's own text. I
offer Utopia
Modernism as the primary pair of contraries in the text
(S
-S), which in turn generate the subcontraries of Ideology and
Marxism respectively. Ironically, one could argue for
affinity
between each corner of this new rectangle and its Conradian counter
part according
Jameson. The Utopian (with its idée fixe of a future
Utopian place of truth) would fulfill a role similar
that of Jameson's
Ideal, while Modernism (with
stereotypical isolation of the individ
ual trapped within one's own consciousness) would fulfill a role similar
to that of Jameson's Self. Marxism (with its transcendence of
indi
vidual in favor of the collective) would fulfill a role similar
that of
Jameson's Selflessness, while Ideology (with
inherent opposition to
stereotypical denial of the necessity of the utopian happy ending)
would fulfill a role similar to that of Jameson's Cynicism. One might
even construct similar semic combinations at the vertical sides — with
Modernism and Ideology combining to reveal History in late capitalist
commodity fetishism as a semic space of castration, and with Utopian
idealism
Marxism combining to reveal their unconsummated Mar
riage in the pages of The Political Unconscious itself as a semic space of
extinction.
The workings of
new rectangle's complex term (the ideal syn
thesis of Utopia
Modernism) nicely follows
lines of Jameson's
own dissection of Nostromo: "the act happens" (278) — the Utopian
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combines with the Modernist text somehow to confirm that
ideolo
gy ... is in
very nature Utopian" (289) — "even though it is impossi
ble" (278). As far as The Witness is concerned, neither Marxism nor Ide
ology (within the context of Jameson's "story" of The Political Uncon
scious) is willing or able to expose the illusion or lie of his deliberate
miswriting of the triumph of Utopian
If only The Political
Unconscious, like Nostromo in Jameson's reading, could have
faith with this impossibility
insisted] to the end on everything
problematical about the act that makes for genuine historical change"
(277).
Modernism (which, again, here should be read as including Late
Victorian Aestheticism, Decadence,
Fin
Siècle) is that against
which Jameson's Marxism defines itself. In "Reflections
the BrechtLukács Debate"
elsewhere, Jameson makes it very clear that con
temporary Marxism is still hashing through this debate's pair of con
traries, modernism
realism. It is nevertheless very clear which side
Jameson feels represents the truth about modernism: It is Lukács both
has
provisional last word for us today" where this debate is
concerned ("Reflections" 146) and who "turns out in the long run to have
been right after
about the nature of modernism" ("Beyond" 130). The
"ideology of modernism," according to Jameson, "imposes its conceptu
al limitations
our aesthetic thinking
our taste and judgments,
in its own way projects
utterly distorted model of literary histo
ry," which leads him bemoan our unfamiliarity with "the older social
cultic functions of literature" ("Beyond" 117).
Along these
lines, for Jameson modernist texts are "ways
distorting and repressing reality" that attempt
"manage" rather than
"express" the "same fears
concerns" which serve as the "raw mater
ial of revolutionary
by "disguising] them,
driv[ing] them
underground" ("Modernism" 179). Wary that an iconoclastic "repudia
tion" of such works only would "reconfirm the reified prestige,
as it
were
sacred aura, of these fetishized names
reputations," Jame
son advocates a process "on the order of the psychoanalytic working
through" that could "be expected
dissolve the reification of the great
modernistic works,
return these artistic
academic 'monu
ments'
their original reality as the private language of isolated indi
viduals in a reified society" ("Modernism" 179).
One need only recall that Jameson in The Political Unconscious posits
modernism as "itself an ideological expression of capitalism" (236) to
understand the significance of his hearkening back to this older focus
of Marxist critique before Althusser (the nature of modernism, as
opposed to the nature of ideology): as reflected in my semiotic rectan
gle, modernism
ideology are written as two sides of the same late
capitalistic commodity fetishism coin (the return of the old standby
false consciousness with a vengeance). In this light, the imaginary res
olution of The Political Unconscious at bottom is a Utopian gesture intent
denying the terrifying possibilities of the abyss of nihilism that the
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Conradian text in particular and modernism in general opens before
Jameson. This gesture ultimately must subsume
ideology within a
Utopian Necessity
effect the ideal synthesis of Jameson's complex
term. It is this Utopian Necessity which serves as the idea at the back of
Jameson's project that redeems it (and his deliberate miswriting of it) in
Jameson's mind.
It is perhaps not pure coincidence that the formalist means by
which Jameson arrives at this Utopian Necessity is indebted to
Marin's work on the Utopian narrative. In fact, Jameson borrows the
tool of the Greimassian semiotic rectangle from Marin, within whose
project the rectangle is used as a model for the Utopian narrative
proper rather than for narrative in general. What wonder, then, that
Jameson's use of this same schema in
Political Unconscious yields
an ultimately Utopian reading of the ideology ofform. Is it possible that
it is Jameson's Utopian model itself that (pre)determines the Utopian
outcome in
Political Unconscious?
Marin writes that Utopian reading leads
the ironically very
Conradian-sounding "realization that the way in which the story is told
is the story itself, that the narrative never in reality narrates anything
other than its own narrative procedures" (qtd. in "Of Islands" 101).
Jameson clearly has taken Marin's realization
heart. Jameson con
cludes his essay on Marin with
analogy for "our inability to conceive
[Utopia], our incapacity to produce it as a vision, our failure to project
the Other of what
("Of Islands" 101) — it is an image of "fireworks
dissolving back into the night sky, [which] must once again leave us alone
with this history" that Jameson offers as a figure for this failure.
Jameson opens
final section of his concluding chapter
Marx
ism and Form (a section entitled "Marxism and Inner Form") with an epi
graph from Schiller. He reads this epigraph as suggesting a "dialectical
notion of form
content" in which "either term can be translated into
the other" (Marxism 403). He elaborates, "In fact, this essential distinc
tion is useful only on condition that it ultimately reabolish itself in the
ambiguity of the artistic substance itself, which can be seen alternately
as either
content or all form" (Marxism 403). I argue,
that
Jameson is profoundly uncomfortable with this ambiguity, with the
hazy after-glow of fireworks dissolving back into the night sky. He is
profoundly uncomfortable with the sort of stories attributed by Con
rad's narrator to the Marlow of Heart of Darkness: "to him the meaning of
an episode was not inside like a kernel but outside, enveloping the
which brought it out only as a glow brings out a haze" (9). He is pro
foundly uncomfortable with the utopic haze of undecidability repre
sented by the Conradian after-glow.
Instead, Jameson offers the self-termed "materialistic kernel" of
Schiller's remark (the "materialistic kernel" to the properly dialectical
"ambiguity" of Schiller's romantic irony) as being that "any stylization or
abstraction in [a work's] form must ultimately express
profound
inner logic in
content,
is itself ultimately dependent for its exis-
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tence on the structures of the social raw materials themselves" (Marxism
403). Thus Jameson's restatement of Schiller's aforementioned "dialecti
notion of form
content" in which "either term can be translated
into the other" is: "thus every layer of content proves, as Schiller implies,
. . . but a form in disguise" (Marxism
Clearly when Jameson
appears to concur with Schiller that "the ambiguity of the artistic sub
stance itself . .. can be seen alternately as either
content or
form,"
he in fact prefers
see the artistic substance as all form,
the time.
Jameson requires such a "materialistic kernel of truth" to ground his
Utopian determinism,
in this he veers into Ideology at
expense
of the very dialectic of utopia
ideology itself.
In conclusion, returning
Althusser's "A Letter on Art," while the
Jamesonian critique does indeed demonstrate that on one level "what
art makes us see . . . is the ideology from which it is born, in which it
bathes, from which it detaches itself as art,
which it alludes," by
introducing the notion of the Utopian impulse Jameson would seem to
imply that it also imparts some sort of knowledge of History as the
experience of Necessity
if this knowledge is only in the form of
retextualized effects). This seems
transgress the line of seeing "con
clusions without premisses" [sic] and instead produces "'conclusions'
out of 'premisses'" [sic] (Althusser
must question whether
Jameson has ignored Althusser's warning of "mov[ing] too quickly to
'something else,"'
in so doing has arrived at
ideology of art"
(Althusser
In the final analysis Jameson's project of articulating a
new Marxist hermeneutic that among other things must "come to terms"
with "History itself as one long nightmare" (299) can appear as nothing
more than Jameson's own ideological "choice of nightmares" (Conrad,
Heart
like Marlow before him, Jameson is unable faithfully
ren
der
the hollowness of Kurtz (indeed of Heart of Darkness itself) "that
justice which
[its] due" (76).

Notes
1. One must recall that Heart of Darkness originally
published seri
ally in 1899 in Blackwood's Magazine as "The Heart of Darkness." I also
think it important to acknowledge
ways in which late Victorian Aes
theticism, Decadence,
the Fin Siècle represents the true beginning
of modernism.
2. Such disagreements often have revolved around the status of mod
ernist texts such as Conrad's rather than upon the proper definition of
ideology. On
side the Marxism of Georg Lukács denounced the
"false subjectivism" of modem writers as inherently solipsistic and
nihilistic, and as a means of avoiding
thereby perpetuating the his
torical reality of late capitalism. On the
the Marxism of Theodor
Adorno admired
modernist's fragmented subjectivism as offering a
critique of the very "commodity fetishism" it represents. Althusser's
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Marxism incorporated both of these views in his reconception of ideol
ogy. For Althusser, the "internal distantiation" Adorno would argue
Conrad achieves at the same time "presupposes" the presence of "that
ideology itself' (203), as Lukács would have it. Though this brief summa
ry is inevitably reductive, the point here is that Althusser refocuses the
Marxist critique by concentrating
what is meant by ideology.
3. All subsequent citations of Jameson are from The Political Unconscious
unless otherwise indicated.
4. Interestingly, Jameson writes of his use of Greimas,
appropri
ated, or perhaps indeed misappropriated, by a dialectical criticism ..."
(48).
5. All subsequent citations of Conrad are from the Norton edition of
Heart of Darkness unless otherwise indicated.
6. One should note here perhaps, that Marlow himself is not without his
own admiration of (if not disbelief in) Kurtz in spite of his cynicism:
"This is the reason why I affirm that Kurtz was a remarkable man.
had something to say [which Marlow does
.... He had summed
up — he had judged. 'The horror!'" (69).
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